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Dewsnup v. Timm 1: Judicial Sleight of 
Hand in Statutory Construction of the 
Bankruptcy Code 
I. INTRODUCTION 
United States Law Week hailed Dewsnup v. Timm2 as 
"the most complicated issue of statutory construction in this 
term's bankruptcy crop."3 The Court used this case to settle 
a debate over contradictory attempts among the circuits to 
interpret sections 506(a) and 506(d) of the Bankruptcy 
Code.4 The interpretive attempts applied to a Chapter 7 
debtor's ability to "strip down" a creditor's lien on real prop-
erty to the current value of the property. This casenote first 
outlines the background leading to different statutory inter-
pretations among the circuits and the facts of Dewsnup 
chosen by the Court to settle the debate. This note then 
outlines the proceedings of Dewsnup from the bankruptcy 
court to the Supreme Court. This note then proceeds to 
examine the reasoning of the Court's three-part test used in 
arriving at the Dewsnup decision and explains how the 
Court's reasoning departs from previous practice. Finally, 
this note suggests a more specific application of the above 
three-part test to Dewsnup using the reasoning of a previ-
ous bankruptcy case. 
II. BACKGROUND 
There has been a considerable difference in opmwn 
dividing the circuits regarding the relationship between sec-
tions 506(a) and 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.5 The dis-
1. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992). 
2. ld. 
3. 61 U.S.L.W. 3067, 3072 (U.S. Aug. 11, 1992). 
4. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), (d) (1988). 
5. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988), reads in full: 
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in 
which the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 
553 of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such 
creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property, or to the ex-
tent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unse-
cured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the 
amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim. 
319 
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pute revolved around the rights of the debtor and creditor 
when a lien is undersecured. The Court granted certiorari in 
Dewsnup to settle that dispute. In doing so, the Court rec-
ognized that the submissions of the parties and amici were 
model representatives of the issues involved in the interpre-
tation of the relationship between sections 506(a) and 
506(d).6 Because these issues go to ownership and credit, 
the basis of the secured transaction, they are very im por-
tant to a society that operates on credit and values owner-
ship rights in property. The issues involve the balance of 
competing interests. The first is the supposed "fresh start" 
offered a debtor in bankruptcy. The other is the interest of 
a creditor seeking her contractual due when a debtor de-
faults. How society balances these interests affects the avail-
ability of consumer and commercial loans as well as the 
interest rates paid for these loans. 
These issues are especially acute when, in a bankruptcy 
proceeding, the amount of a creditor's lien is above the 
current value of the property securing the lien. Sometimes, 
and for several possible reasons, a loan becomes 
undersecured; thus the collateral is worth less than the 
amount owed. Technically, this bifurcates the loan into se-
cured and unsecured portions. Before Dewsnup, courts treat-
ed the undersecured lien differently, using either a "strip 
Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation 
and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunc-
tion with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting 
such creditor's interest. 
(b) To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property 
the value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, 
is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the 
holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, 
costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under which such 
claim arose. 
(c) The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured 
claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or dis-
posing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such 
claim. 
(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that 
is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void, unless-
(!) such claim was disallowed only under section 502(b)(5) or 502(e) of 
this title; or 
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure 
of any entity to file a proof of such claim under section 501 of this title. 
6. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 776-77. 
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down" action or a Dewsnup approach. A "strip down" voids 
the unsecured portion of the lien, giving no relief to the 
creditor for that portion of the lien. A Dewsnup approach 
just affects the priority of distribution from the debtor's 
estate, maintaining both parts of the creditor's loan. The 
part equal to the value of the collateral is secured. The 
other portion is considered an unsecured claim, treated with 
all other general claims on the bankruptcy estate. 
The circuit disagreement revolved around the issue of 
this "strip down." Stripping the portion of the creditor's lien 
above the current value of the property leaves no recourse 
available to the creditor, but does provide the debtor with 
incentive to redeem the property. Gaglia v. First Federal 
Savings & Loan Association 7 illustrates this rule. This was 
considered the majority position. 8 The fresh start doctrine 
in bankruptcy justified this rule. 
Other courts formed a "strong minority'>!! agreeing with 
the Tenth Circuit's decision in In re Dewsnup. 10 These 
courts reasoned that the lien overage should not be stripped 
away. The creditor's lien is bifurcated into secured and 
unsecured portions. This allows the secured lienholder some 
solace as well as the benefit of pre-foreclosure sale increases 
in real property value. Both views came from interpretations 
of sections 506(a) and 506(d). 
III. THE PROCEEDINGS 
A. Case Facts 
Petitioner Althea Dewsnup and her husband borrowed 
$119,000 from the respondents. A Deed of Trust on two par-
cels of Utah farmland owned by the Dewsnups secured the 
loan. One year later, petitioner defaulted on the loan. Re-
spondents issued a notice of default and began a foreclosure 
of the collateral property. Petitioner filed a Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy petition seeking liquidation, staying the foreclosure. 
During the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, peti-
tioner represented that the then owing debt (about 
$120,000) exceeded the court-found fair market value of the 
7. 889 F .2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989). 
8. In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588, 589 (lOth Cir. 1990). 
9. !d. 
10. !d. 
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land ($39,000). The petitioner asked the court to apply the 
"strip down" approach and thus reduce the lien to $39,000. 
The immediate benefits to the petitioner would be the re-
moval of a sizeable claim against the estate and a greater 
motivation to redeem the property. 
B. Procedural History 
The Bankruptcy Court denied petitioner relief. 11 The 
United States District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court 
without an opinion. 12 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit also affirmed. 13 The United States Supreme Court 
later granted certiorari. 14 
C. Supreme Court Holding 
The Supreme Court held that a Chapter 7 debtor may 
not "strip down" a creditor's lien on real property to the 
judicially determined value of the collateral when that value 
is less than the amount of the claim secured by the lien. 
IV. REASONING 
A. Lower Courts' Reasoning 
The Supreme Court touched only lightly on the ratio-
nales of the lower courts. The lower courts denied relief to 
the petitioner because the trustee abandoned the property. 
Abandonment means the property returns to the debtor and 
is no longer part nor concern of the estate. Therefore, sec-
tion 506(a), and section 506(d) by implication, no longer ap-
plied because the property was no longer "property in which 
the estate has an interest."15 There is no specific indication 
why Justice Blackmun's majority opinion did not use this 
reasoning. Apparently this rationale would not allow the 
Supreme Court to get at the issue of statutory construction. 
Therefore, the Court undoubtedly embarked on an analysis 
allowing it to reach the statutory construction issue brewing 
just beyond the scope of the lower courts' holdings. 
11. In re Dewsnup, 87 B.R. 676 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988). 
12. Dewsnup v. Thrun, 112 S. Ct. at 776 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a). 
13. Dewsnup v. Tirrun, 908 F.2d 588 (lOth Cir. 1990). 
14. In re Dewsnup, 111 S. Ct. 949 (1991). 
15. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988). 
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B. Positions of the Parties and Amici 
Petitioner argued that sections 506(a) and 506(d) are 
complementary and should be read together. 16 Petiti9ner 
reasoned that the plain language of the statute indicates a 
relationship between the security reducing provision of sec-
tion 506(a)17 and the lien avoiding provision of section 
506(d). 18 If the two sections are complementary and relat-
ed, it is easier to accept the idea that "allowed secured 
claim" means the same thing in both sections. 
Petitioner's amicus argued the lien voiding language of 
section 506(d) is plain. When faced with a claim other than 
an allowed secured claim, the bankruptcy court must void 
it. Amicus further reasoned that the effect of the Tenth 
Circuit's decision would lead to evisceration of a debtor's 
right of redemption and that undersecured creditors would 
be unable to participate in the distribution of the assets of 
the estate. 19 
Respondents answered that sections 506(a) and 506(d) 
are not "rigidly tied" to each other.20 They argued that 
506(a) deals with classifying claims at the time of distribu-
tion. This interpretation relies on the closing language of 
506(a). "Such value shall be determined in light of the ... 
proposed disposition or use of such property . ."21 But 
the lien voiding power of 506(d) is directed at the time 
16. Petitioner explains: 
Because, under section 506(a), a claim is secured only to the extent of the 
judicially determined value of the real property on which the lien is fixed, 
a debtor can void a lien on the property pursuant to section 506(d) to the 
extent the claim is no longer secured and thus is not 'an allowed secured 
claim.' In other words, section 506(a) bifurcates classes of claims allowed 
under section 502 into secured claims and unsecured claims; any portion 
of an allowed claim deemed to be unsecured under section 506(a) is not 
an 'allowed secured claim' within the lien-voiding scope of section 506(d). 
Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 776-77. 
17. Supra note 4. Since an "allowed claim" is divided into allowed secured and 
allowed unsecured portions when the claim is undersecured, petitioner urged that 
respondents would have an "allowed secured claim" only to the extent of the judi-
cially determined value of the collateral. 
18. Supra note 4. Petitioner argued the Court must void the unsecured portion 
of respondents' claim because it was not an "allowed secured claim" within the 
meaning of § 506(a). 
19. !d. at 777. 
20. !d. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 7). 
21. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988). 
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when foreclosure takes place, referring to the exceptions to 
the voiding power, which in turn refer to occurrences at the 
start of bankruptcy. 
Respondents and the United States as amicus curiae 
argued in the alternative that the words "allowed secured 
claim" in section 506(d) do not have to be read as an indi-
visible term of art defined by reference to section 506(a). 
Instead, respondents and amicus reasoned that each claim 
must be examined first as an allowed claim, and then as a 
secured claim. Respondents then concluded that since the 
claim in question is allowed under section 502 and is se-
cured by a lien on underlying property, it does not fall 
within the lien voiding power of section 506( d). Section 
506(d) voids only claims that are not allowed and not se-
cured. 
Lastly, respondents made two additional arguments. The 
first related to pre-Code bankruptcy law. Historically, liens 
like the one in question passed through bankruptcy pre-
served. Respondents argued that nothing in the Code's legis-
lative history reflects an intent to alter the law. Therefore, 
the pre-Code standard controls. The second argument related 
to the policy that bankruptcy provides a fresh start to the 
debtor. One purpose served by the bankruptcy process is to 
relieve an insolvent party of excessive indebtedness. This is 
accomplished either by liquidation or by a reorganization 
allowing the party to make reasonable payments on his 
indebtedness. Respondents claimed such a policy cannot 
justify an impairment of respondents' property rights. This 
is because the fresh start policy does not extend to an in 
rem claim against property, only to a discharge of personal 
liability. 
C. Reasoning of the High Court 
The Court recited the various positions of the parties 
and amici in its opinion to prove "that section 506 of the 
Bankruptcy Code and its relationship to other provisions of 
that Code do embrace some ambiguities."22 This is the only 
proof the Court used to determine the facial ambiguity of 
sections 506(a) and 506(d). 
22. Id. 
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In spite of the scarce position, it is this finding of ambi-
guity by the Court that decided the outcome by triggering a 
three-part test involving (1) ambiguity, (2) legislative history 
analysis and (3) pre-Code law analysis. Although the Court 
said it was inclined to agree with petitioner's argument that 
the words "allowed secured claim" should take on the same 
meaning in both subsections,23 pre-Code law and the prac-
tical effect of petitioner's argument persuaded the Court to 
find for respondents, upon finding that sections 506(a) and 
506(d) were ambiguous.24 Thus, respondents won by de-
fault. 
Mter deciding that the number of different arguments 
espoused in Dewsnup was the equivalent of a finding of 
ambiguity, the Court turned to the legislative history of the 
Bankruptcy Code. The Court found no significant language 
in the legislative history to warrant a change from the pre-
Code law.25 Thus, an examination of pre-Code law was in 
order. The Court determined that under the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898, a lien on real property passed through bankruptcy 
unaffected. The Court cited several cases to support this 
proposition.26 The Court put its findings together to deny 
petitioner's requested relief. 27 On this basis, the United 
2:1. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 778. 
24. In interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, the Court does not do so with blind-
ers on. This means previous related judicial and legislative action must be consid-
ered. In the absence of clear statutory text and in light of long-standing pre-Code 
practice, the Court will not presume to do the job of the legislature. The pre-Code 
law must be examined as well as the legislative history surrounding the drafting 
of the Code. If a particular interpretation contradicts pre-Code law, something in 
the legislative history must justify such an interpretation. 
25. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 357 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787. 
26. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825, 1829 (1991) ("Ordinarily, liens 
and other secured interests survive bankruptcy."); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 
111 S. Ct. 2150, 2154 (1991) ("Rather, a bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only 
one mode of enforcing a claim-namely, an action against the debtor in perso-
nam-while leaving intact another-namely, an action against the debtor in rem."); 
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 579 (1935) ("No in-
stance has been found, except under the Frazier-Lemke Act, of either a statute or 
decision compelling the mortgagee to relinquish the property to the mortgagor free 
of the lien unless the debt was paid in full."); Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886) 
(holding that a discharge in bankruptcy does not release real estate of the debtor 
from the lien of a mortgage created by him before the bankruptcy). 
27. The Court stated: 
[ G liven the ambiguity here, to attribute to Congress the intention to 
grant a debtor the broad new remedy against allowed claims to the ex-
tent that they become 'unsecured' for the purposes of section 506(a) with-
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States Supreme Court affirmed the judgement of the Tenth 
Circuit. 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Dewsnup Court used the historic form of looking at 
a statute using three steps. First, the Court asked whether 
the challenged words were plain or ambiguous. Second, the 
Court looked at these words in light of the legislative histo-
ry of the Code. Third, the Court looked to the pre-Code law. 
This analysis will show that the Court used the correct 
form for general examination, but the examination lacked 
specific detail and substance. 
A. First Step: A Finding of Ambiguity 
As Justice Scalia28 correctly observed in his dissent, 
the Court avoided a thorough use of the available analysis 
techniques. The Dewsnup Court disregarded an existing test 
used in the first step of statutory inquiry. Another Bank-
ruptcy Code case decided recently involving section 506(b) 
outlined this test. 29 Sweeping aside contentions by the par-
ties, the opinion in Ron Pair started "where all such inqui-
ries must begin: with the language of the statute itself."30 
This is the best place to start with any legislative inquiry. 
The Court in Ron Pair unfolded a three-part method of 
inquiry. First, a "natural reading of the [relevant] phrase." 
Second, an examination of the "grammatical structure of the 
out the new remedy's being mentioned somewhere in the Code itself or in 
the annals of Congress is not plausible . . . and is contrary to basic 
bankruptcy principles. 
Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 779. 
28. Two schools of thought dominate judicial interpretation of the law. One 
favors the establishment of clear roles, providing bright lines applicable to all cases 
in the field. One attribute of this is dependability. The other approach favors the 
balancing of interests. An attribute of this is fairness. Students of Constitutional 
law will note that Justice Scalia is well known for his advocacy of rule-based 
decisionmaking. It seems only fitting that Justice Scalia should be the one to dis-
sent here. In Dewsnup, the Court appears to depart from a previous method of 
determination (rule basis) in a case standing as precedent in order to reach a 
conclusion it feels is correct. Justice Scalia points this out. 
29. United StateH v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989) (addressing the 
issue of whether non-consensual, over-secured creditors were entitled to post-peti-
tion interest). 
30. !d. at 241. 
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statute." Third, a comparison with similar terms used 
throughout the Code."31 
A bankruptcy litigator, not to mention the Courts of 
Appeal, will be confused by the method used in Dewsnup. 
In Ron Pair the Court clearly laid out the test for a finding 
of statutory ambiguity. The Court gave detail to its method. 
In Dewsnup, the Court, in substance, cast all that aside and 
made no inquiry on its own as to the ambiguity of sections 
506(a) and 506(d). As pointed out previously in part IV.C., 
there is no evidence of an independent analysis. The Court 
was quick to find ambiguity. This is important to under-
stand since the Court can generally only get at statutory 
interpretation if the language is ambiguous. If a statute's 
language is plain, "the sole function of the courts is to en-
force it according to its terms."32 It leaves the litigator and 
circuit court justice wondering what method will be used by 
the Court when next called on to interpret a statute. It is 
unclear whether plainness or ambiguity is decided by an 
independent test or by the mood and structure of the Court 
on appeal. This makes adequate representation, preparation 
and judicial finding most difficult. 
Instead of listing the various positions of the parties 
and amici as evidence of statutory ambiguity, the Court 
should have made its own inquiry. Just because parties dis-
agree as to the meaning of a statute does not mean the 
statute is ambiguous. A party's personal agenda, either 
consciously or subconsciously, affects statutory reading. A 
neutral party may find it plain and clear through indepen-
dent analysis after a presentation by advocates in our ad-
versarial system. The Court should have embarked on a 
reading of both subsections, studied their grammatical struc-
ture and examined use of similar terminology throughout 
the Code. 
31. Id. at 241, 242 n.5. 
32. Carninetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). 
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1. Applying the three-part Ron Pair Standard 
a. A "natural reading" of the statute. Section 506(a) has 
several pertinent terms. They include "allowed claim," "se-
cured claim" and "unsecured claim." The section clearly dif-
ferentiates between an allowed secured claim and an al-
lowed unsecured claim. The former exists "to the extent of 
the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest 
in such property .... "33 In other words, an allowed se-
cured claim exists when the creditor's interest is less than 
or equal to the value the property has to the estate. The 
latter exists "to the extent that the value of such creditor's 
interest . . . is less than the amount of such allowed 
claim."34 "Such creditor's interest" refers to the "secured 
claim" which is defined in section 506(a). Therefore, that 
portion of the creditor's allowed claim that is greater than 
the secured claim is an "allowed unsecured claim." 
Using the facts of Dewsnup, this means that the lien 
was an allowed claim. The judicially determined value of 
the property was $39,000.35 This is the value the property 
had to the estate. Thus, $39,000 of respondents' lien repre-
sented an allowed secured claim and $81,00036 represented 
an allowed unsecured claim, both defined by section 506(a). 
While subsection (a) of section 506 carefully defines 
"allowed secured claim" and "allowed unsecured claim," sub-
section (d) confuses the statute's meaning by using the term 
"allowed secured claim" negatively: "a claim . . . that is not 
an allowed secured claim . . .. "37 A claim "that is not an 
allowed secured claim" could be either a disallowed claim or 
an allowed unsecured claim. Two things lead the reader to 
choose allowed unsecured claim as the better choice. First, 
section 506(a) makes reference to allowed unsecured claims 
but not to disallowed claims. Second, since section 506(d) 
uses the specific terni "disallowed claim" elsewhere, it leads 
the reader to think the two are separate terms. Therefore, a 
33. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988), supra note 4. 
34. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988), supra note 4. 
35. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 776. 
36. !d. The amount owing on the lien was $120,000. Subtract the $39,000 al-
lowed secured claim and that leaves $81,000 as the allowed unsecured claim. 
:~7. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988) (emphasis added), supra note 4. 
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natural reading of section 506(d) leads the reader to infer "a 
claim . . . that is not an allowed secured claim . . . ," re-
fers to an allowed unsecured claim. This suggests that a 
lien securing an allowed unsecured claim is void. In 
Dewsnup, this means the $81,000 portion of the lien is void. 
b. The grammatical structure. A study of the 
grammatical structure is a look at the use of punctuation, 
conjunctive words and modifiers within the statute.38 Writ-
ings (like statutes) that attempt to cover many possibilities 
are often fraught with veritable mazes of phrases set aside 
by commas. Many times terms and modifiers are hopelessly 
set apart this way. By a careful mapping of the phrases the 
reader can clear away potential ambiguities. Fortunately, 
the sections pertinent to this analysis are clear. 
The focus here is on the term "allowed secured claim" 
as used in section 506(d). The emphasis is here because the 
Court adopted respondents' position that the words are not 
an indivisible term of art. 39 The pertinent part of section 
506(d) reads: "To the extent that a lien secures a claim 
against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, 
such lien is void, . . . ."40 There is no comma between "al-
lowed" and "secured," nor is there any word between the 
two indicating a break in the term (i.e., "allowed or secured 
claim"). Grammatically, the words "allowed secured claim" 
are an indivisible term. Therefore, a lien securing a claim 
that is not both an allowed and a secured claim is void 
under section 506( d). 
c. Use of the terminology throughout the Code. Under 
this prong, consistent term usage throughout the Code is 
sought.41 Since Congress chose the vague language of a 
"claim ... that is not an allowed secured claim ... " rather 
38. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989). 
39. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 778. 
40. 11 u.s.c. § 506(d) (1988). 
41. The Court has often invoked the "'normal rule of statutory construction that 
identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the 
same meaning.'" Sullivan v. Stroop, 110 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (1990) (quoting Sorenson 
v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986) (quoting Helvering v. 
Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87 (1934) (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & 
Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)))). 
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than one of the two specific possibilities, it is a natural 
assumption that Congress intended both terms to be usable 
in the context of the section 506(d) voiding power. As Jus-
tice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, the Bankruptcy Code 
is consistent in its use of the phrase "allowed unsecured 
claim" to describe that portion of the claim treated as unse-
cured as under section 506(a).42 Similarly, the Code is con-
sistent in its use of the term "disallowed claim."43 Since 
the Code consistently uses both "allowed unsecured claim" 
and "disallowed claim" where applicable, the use of a more 
encompassing term is not ambiguous. Either type of claim is 
subject to the lien voiding power. 
B. The Second Step: Relevant Legislative History 
"[W]here the language is unambiguous, silence in the 
legislative history cannot be controlling."44 This quotation 
plainly states that once the above analysis has reached the 
conclusion that sections 506(a) and 506(d) are plain, the 
analysis stops and the plain meaning controls. As stated 
earlier, this is true usually, but a noticeable exception ex-
ists. "The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, 
except in the 'rare cases [in which] the literal application of 
a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with 
the intentions of its drafters."'45 
The most interesting part of the Court's legislative his-
tory analysis is not the history itself. Instead it is the 
Court's radical change of attitude from 1989 to 1992, about 
what the history means. The Court found no particular 
language in the history to support or refute petitioner's 
claims. The Court then detailed a historical line of cases 
42. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1988) (fixing priority of "allowed unsecured 
claims of governmental units"); § 726(a)(2) (providing for payment of "allowed unse-
cured claim!s]" in Chapter 7 liquidation); § 1225(a)(4) (setting standard for treat-
ment of "allowed unsecured claim[s]" in Chapter 12 plan); § 1325(a)(4) (setting 
standard for treatment of "allowed unsecured claim[s]" in Chapter 13 plan). 
43. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988) (stating, if "claim ... is disallowed" in-
voluntary bankruptcy can continue); § 522 (bad faith adversarial proceeding by 
creditor can result in "claim being disallowed"); § 723 (grounds for disallowing 
claims of partnership creditors); § 1126 (creditor whose claim is disallowed is not 
entitled to vote on Chapter 11 plan); § 1328 ("specifically discharges claims that 
are not allowed"). 
44. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 779. 
45. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting 
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). 
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holding that a lien survives bankruptcy intact.46 The opin-
ion then stated "Congress must have enacted the Code with 
a full understanding of this practice."47 Furthermore, the 
Court stated, "When Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, 
it does not write 'on a clean slate."'48 Putting these factors 
together, the Court put quite a bit of emphasis on pre-Code 
law. 
When faced with the same type of decision in the Ron 
Pair case the Court had a completely different approach. 
Initially, it is worth recalling that Congress worked on the 
formulation of the Code for nearly a decade. It was intend-
ed to modernize the bankruptcy laws, and as a result 
made significant changes in both the substantive and pro-
cedural laws of bankruptcy. In particular, Congress intend-
ed "significant changes from current law in ... the treat-
ment of secured creditors and secured claims." In such a 
substantial overhaul of the system, it is not appropriate or 
realistic to expect Congress to have explained with particu-
larity each step it took. Rather, as long as the statutory 
scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no 
need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of 
the statute. 49 
The finding by the Dewsnup Court that "Congress must 
have enacted the Code with a full understanding of this 
practice [of lien survivaly>5° does not equate with a finding 
that the plain reading of sections 506(a) and 506(d) produc-
es "a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its 
drafters."51 Therefore, by the Court's own admission in Ron 
Pair, the plain reading controls. 
C. The Third Step: Pre-Code Law 
Justice Blackmun's opinion does, as previously stated, 
provide a fine showing of the state of the pre-Code law in 
46. Supra note 25 (referring to Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 779). 
47. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 779. 
48. ld. (quoting Emil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515, 521 (1943)). 
49. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989) (cita-
tions omitted). 
50. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 779. 
51. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting 
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). 
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the area of lien survival through bankruptcy.52 However, 
the pre-Code law is of little consequence in light of the 
analysis in parts V.A.l.-V.B. concerning the natural reading 
of sections 506(a) and 506(d) and the lack of finding that 
the plain reading is at odds with the drafters intent. 
D. Policy Considerations 
Policy-wise, the Court pointed out that the practical 
effect of petitioner's argument would be to freeze the 
creditor's secured interest at the value found in the court 
proceeding. Time will pass between the date of such deter-
mination and the date of the sale and the property value 
could increase in the interim. However, the creditor would 
be unable to collect more than the judicially approved value. 
The excess would go to the debtor as a "windfall." A per-
fected secured creditor then could not rely on the safety his 
status purports to give. No loan could truly be considered 
safe from a "strip down." Among other things, this increased 
risk would lead to higher mortgage interest rates. This may 
have weighted the Court's analysis. However, there is no 
provision for these considerations in the three-part test set 
out and used. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Court's application of the statutory construction of 
sections 506(a) and 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code is essen-
tially form without substance. Statutory construction in-
volves three steps. First, a court must find whether a stat-
ute is plain or ambiguous on its face. Second, a court looks 
to legislative history to find the intent of the drafters. 
Third, a court looks to the pre-Code law. Clearly the em-
phasis is on the first step. If the statute is plain on its 
face, it is only construed otherwise if it produces "a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters."53 
That is a high hurdle to get over. If the statute is facially 
ambiguous, a court examines it in light of both legislative 
intent and pre-Code law. Lacking clear legislative intent, the 
pre-Code practice controls. 
52. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 77fl-79. 
53. Supra note 44. 
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The Dewsnup Court apparently started the process with 
a policy oriented result in mind. The process was not ob-
jectively undertaken. The analysis lacked depth. The Court 
glossed over the plain versus ambiguous analysis. The Court 
also acted inconsistently with precedent in interpreting the 
state of legislative history. This allowed the Court to give 
unnecessary weight to the pre-Code law in order to invali-
date the mortgage "strip down." 
Had the Court undertaken a more thorough and neutral 
analysis, the plainness of the statutory language would have 
been clear. Use of the more thorough analysis opens the 
door to a different result, one which eliminates the policy 
consideration guesswork for practitioners and fact finders. 
A. W. Bailey III 
